Reasonable Disagreement

Throughout this series, we've established rigorous definitions for harm, coercion, and consent. Yet a critical implication of these definitions is that reasonable people can still disagree about whether a particular event or action meets these criteria, even when presented with precisely the same information.

Why does this happen? Because each of these definitions is fundamentally agent-relative and vantage-dependent, relying heavily on subjective judgments and individual perspectives:

• Harm involves evaluating whether an agent's capacity to pursue valued goals was genuinely degraded. What goals matter, how significantly they must be impacted, and even whether an impact constitutes real functional degradation can differ considerably between observers. Different agents have diverse values and varying thresholds for what counts as meaningful impairment.

• Coercion hinges on whether a threat of harm was credible and aimed specifically at gaining compliance. Credibility is inherently subjective, influenced by factors such as past experiences, context, and perceived intent. Perceptions of whether an action constitutes a genuine threat or merely informational communication can vary widely among reasonable people.

• Consent depends on whether an agreement was informed, intentional, and uncoerced—each of these components can be open to extensive interpretation. Standards for what counts as adequate information, the threshold for intentionality, and judgments about whether pressure crossed into coercion can all differ significantly based on individual and cultural viewpoints.

Importantly, evaluating the truth of these claims often requires modeling the internal states, beliefs, values, and intentions of other agents. Such mental modeling is inherently complex and prone to uncertainty, adding another layer of interpretative difficulty. Different people, even acting reasonably and in good faith, may come to different conclusions based on differing assumptions about what others know, believe, feel, and intend.

This interpretive flexibility isn't a flaw; it's a fundamental feature of our moral and social reasoning. It acknowledges that moral judgments about harm, coercion, and consent are inherently contextual and depend on observers' frameworks, cultural values, personal experiences, and informational vantages. This reflects Conditionalism, which holds that all truth claims are fundamentally conditional and rely on implicit background assumptions for their interpretation. These judgments are not purely objective or universally fixed—they require interpretation and ongoing negotiation.

Our precise definitions help clarify debates but cannot end them entirely. They enable us to pinpoint exactly where reasonable disagreements arise, identifying clearly the assumptions and interpretations underpinning differing conclusions. This clarity provides a structured basis for more productive dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, and careful navigation of the complexities and nuances inherent in moral and social realities.