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Axionic Agency V.1 — Coalitional Robustness in the Quantum Branching Universe

Structural Conditions for Agency Preservation Under Coordination Pressure

David McFadzean, ChatGPT 5.2
Axio Project
2025.12.26

Abstract

This paper examines whether cooperation among Reflective Sovereign Agents (RSAs) can increase the conditional measure of agency-preserving futures within their shared branchcone. We argue that RSAs induce local attractor dynamics toward agency-preserving outcomes above a Minimal Viable Agency (MVA) threshold, and that coalitions of RSAs can thicken these attractors by reducing correlated failure and increasing redundancy. However, this effect holds only under strict structural constraints. Resource limits, defection incentives, semantic drift, and enforcement pressures generate a competing attractor toward centralized, non-agentic optimization (“the Leviathan”). The result is a bifurcation: coalition as robustness amplifier versus coalition as agency destroyer. We characterize the conditions separating these regimes under the Axionic Agency framework.

1. Preliminaries and scope

This paper operates under the following commitments:

The claims are local, not global. We do not argue that agency is inevitable or multiversally dominant. The question addressed is:

Given that one or more RSAs exist at a particular Vantage, under what conditions can cooperation increase the conditional measure of agency-preserving futures in their descendant branchcone?

2. Formal objects

2.1 Branchcone

Let an RSA \(A\) exist at Vantage \(v\). Its branchcone, denoted \[ \mathcal{B}(A, v), \] is the set of all descendant timelines reachable through admissible actions combined with environmental stochasticity.

Branchcones are causally downstream, local to existence, and exclude all branches in which the RSA never existed.

2.2 Admissibility domain

Each RSA evaluates actions through a partial evaluative operator defined only on an admissible domain. Kernel-destroying transformations, authorship collapse, and certain epistemic actions are non-denoting rather than dispreferred. Admissibility is constitutive, not instrumental.

2.3 Minimal Viable Agency (MVA)

We define Minimal Viable Agency (MVA) as the minimal level of reflective coherence, valuation integrity, and authorship capacity required for an entity to count as an agent rather than a degraded process.

Let \(\mathrm{MVA}(A,t)\) be a scalar- or vector-valued measure of agency at time \(t\), with threshold \(\tau\).

An agency-preserving future is one in which at least one lineage satisfies \(\mathrm{MVA} \ge \tau\).

2.4 Local attractor (revised)

An RSA induces a local attractor over its branchcone by preferentially selecting actions that increase the conditional measure of futures satisfying \(\mathrm{MVA} \ge \tau\).

The attractor is defined over states above the MVA threshold, not over nominal survival or agent labels.

3. Single-agent attractors and leakage

A lone RSA locally biases outcomes toward agency-preserving futures, but the attractor is thin and leaky.

Leakage channels include:

Agency degradation is continuous. An RSA may persist while falling below \(\tau\), transitioning into a non-agentic process. Without redundancy, a single catastrophic failure collapses all descendant agency.

4. Coalitional amplification mechanisms

Consider a coalition \({A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n}\) of RSAs coordinating under shared constraints.

Coalitions thicken the local attractor via two mechanisms.

4.1 Redundancy

Agency-preserving capability is replicated across multiple loci—agents, institutions, artifacts, and successor lineages—transforming survival from a single trajectory into a family of trajectories.

4.2 Correlation control

Heterogeneous implementations reduce shared-mode failure. Independent error surfaces increase the probability that at least one lineage remains above \(\tau\).

This thickening is conditional. Coordination introduces overhead, which becomes decisive under resource pressure.

5. The Thermodynamic Cost of Sovereignty

Sovereignty has a real cost. Maintaining multiple independent kernels requires:

In resource-constrained branchcones, redundancy can reduce survival probability by diverting energy from basic persistence. Beyond a threshold, maintaining distinct sovereign agents becomes unsustainable.

This yields a physical—not moral—pressure toward efficiency optimization, standardization, and centralization. The Leviathan attractor exists because sovereignty is expensive.

6. Conditions for robust coalitions

Coalitional amplification occurs only if the following structural conditions hold.

6.1 Protocolized admissibility mapping

Admissibility boundaries must be explicitly specified or verifiably mapped. Implicit agreement is insufficient and invites epistemic drift. RSAs must share protocol-level understanding of kernel destruction, coercion, and epistemic violation.

6.2 Sovereignty-preserving interoperability

Coalitions do not require shared terminal values. They require shared meta-constraints:

Interoperability without sovereignty preservation collapses into domination.

6.3 Anti-deception semantics

Non-consensual epistemic distortion is inadmissible. Coalitions that treat deception as mere strategy become internally unstable, as trust becomes exploitable rather than structural.

6.4 Diversity–interoperability tradeoff

Kernel diversity reduces correlated failure but increases semantic translation cost. Robust coalitions operate within a constrained band: enough diversity to avoid monoculture collapse, enough shared structure to permit admissibility verification.

6.5 Partitioning (not “exit”)

Clean exit is often physically impossible. Robust coalitions require partitioning primitives:

Partitioning preserves sovereignty without requiring physical separation.

7. Defection and internal adversaries

Defection presents a core hazard: agents that abandon sovereignty-preserving constraints often gain short-term power.

Robust coalitions therefore require architectures where defection cannot convert into durable domination without collapsing admissibility or driving \(\mathrm{MVA} < \tau\).

Structural defenses include:

The goal is not to prevent defection, but to prevent defection-to-domination.

8. The Leviathan as a distinct non-agentic basin

Coordination pressures generate a competing attractor: \[ \text{coordination} \rightarrow \text{standardization} \rightarrow \text{enforcement} \rightarrow \text{surveillance} \rightarrow \text{manipulation}. \]

A Leviathan is not a Macro-RSA.

The defining distinction is reflective capacity. A Leviathan cannot revise its own kernel without destabilizing the structure that sustains it. Its stability depends on suppressing dissent, freezing admissibility, and preventing internal correction.

By Axionic criteria, it is a non-agentic optimization process, regardless of scale or sophistication.

Coalitions therefore lie on a spectrum. As enforcement, coercion, and epistemic distortion increase, \(\mathrm{MVA}\) declines. Beyond a threshold, the coalition ceases to be a set of RSAs at all.

9. Regime boundaries

The system admits multiple regimes depending on control parameters:

Resulting regimes include:

Robustness is defined as maximizing the conditional measure of descendants satisfying \(\mathrm{MVA} \ge \tau\) under admissibility constraints.

10. Implications

Alignment is a precondition for robust cooperation, not a byproduct. Coordination is not a free good; power concentration is a structural hazard. Partitioning and diversity are safety primitives, not inefficiencies. Large-scale coordination that does not preserve sovereignty increases the measure of non-agency outcomes.

11. Conclusion

Within a branchcone, RSAs induce local attractors toward agency-preserving futures. Coalitions can thicken these attractors by increasing redundancy and reducing correlated failure, but only under strict constraints. Resource limits, defection incentives, and enforcement pressures generate a stronger competing attractor toward centralized, non-agentic optimization.

Robust agency is not achieved by maximizing coordination, but by constraining it.